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In The Supreme Court
of The State of Utah
MARIE CHILD HAMILTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
12543

-vsGORDON DEAN HAMILTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
This was an action for divorce involving the questions of property settlement between the parties and
the amount of alimony and child support to be paid
by defendant to the plaintiff. At the trial the defendant did not challenge plaintiff's grounds for or
right to a divorce, and there was no dispute as to
custody of the minor children.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was heard by the Honorable Allen B.
Sorensen of the Fourth Judicial District Court in
and for Utah County, sitting without a jury. Judge
Sorensen awarded the plaintiff an interlocutory decree of divorce; the care, custody and control of the
minor children, subject to reasonable visitation by·
defendant; made a property division between the
parties, and made an award of alimony and support
to be paid by appellant to the respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming
in all respects the judgment of the lower court.
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
The case was heard by the court on March 10,
1971. With the exception of witness, Ted Garfield,
who testified only as to the value of the home,
the respective parties were the only witnesses called.
(Tr. 19, Ex. 4)
There was no problem over the custody of the
children or over visitation privileges. (Tr. 18)
Defendant did not contest or challenge plaintiff's
right to the divorce. (Transcript)
The parties were married in 1949. (Tr. 3) Their
2

first child was stillborn, but at the time of the divorce they had five living children varying in age
from five (5) years to nineteen (19) years. (Tr. 4)
The oldest son, Stewart, was married and did not
live at home. (Tr. 4) Early in the marriage plaintiff
worked, at one time for Christensens (store), and at
Mountain Telephone Co. (Tr. 4) Plaintiff's father
gave them a building lot upon which they built their
first home. They later sold that property and used
enough of their equity from that sale to buy the lot
upon which their present home stands, and used the
rest of that equity to start the partnership business
in which defendant is presently engaged. (Tr. 5)
During the last several years of their marriage the
parties lived together but not as husband and wife.
During those times defendant gave plaintiff $150.00
per week to run the home on. (Tr. 6) At the time of
the divorce the plaintiff had a heart problem and
trouble with one of her eyes. (Tr. 8, 9)
The amount of alimony and support needed by
the plaintiff and her children came to $1,007.17 per
month. (Ex. 1) Plaintiff had been employed about
one year at the time of the divorce and earned
$312.00 per month, (Tr. 8) leaving a balance needed
of $695.17. During the time that the parties were
separated before the divorce was instituted the
3

plaintiff had been receiving from defendant $150.00
per week to run the house on. (Tr. 11)

Defendant's income for 1969 was $20,586.89. (Ex. ·
5) At the trial he testified that his income for 1970
was $17,434.39. (Tr. 24; also Ex. 5) At the time of the
divorce hearing defendant was living at the Sage
Motel and taking most of his meals there. (Tr. 26) _,
He testified that his needs were $390.00 per month
for living expenses and $50.00 for debt retirement.
He stated that he generally drew $1,000.00 per month
from the partnership. (Tr. 26 and R. 20) During the
first eleven months of calendar year 1970 he had
withdrawn $16,139.89 from the partnership earnings.
(Ex. 2) When he was on business the partnership
paid for his meals, lodging, and gasoline. He was
also furnished a car at company expense. (Tr. 33)
The assets accumulated by the parties at the time
of the trial were as follows : Home $22,000.00, less
mortgage owing of $7,036.00; furniture and fixtures
$5,000.00; 1969 Pontiac $2,370.00, and equity in the
partnership of $110,988.15. All of these values were
furnished by defendant. (Ex. 4 for expert opinion
on va 1 ue of home and exhibits 2 and 3)
At the conclusion of the hearing the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, trial judge, awarded the plaintiff the following:
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Home, subject to the mortgage; household furniture and fixtures; 1969 Pontiac automobile; $27,000.00 judgment, which was a lien on defendant's interest in the partnership but with no execution for an
18 month period; $100.00 per month per child for
four minor children; $250.00 per month alimony
until the month following satisfaction of judgment,
then $150.00 until the further order of the court. ( R.
33, 34)
By an amendment to the Decree dated May 21,
1971, the trial judge extended the time within which
the $27,000.00 judgment should be paid to 54 months.
(R. 56)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
WAS FAIR AND ENTIRELY EQUITABLE AND
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THE SUPREl\iE
COURT ON APPEAL.
ARGUMENT
The trial court's decree in this matter, establishing the alimony and support to be paid and
the property settlement, was based upon e7idence
taken at the trial practically all of which was furrishecl and ma<le available hy defendant. Defendant's
5

expert valued the home at $22,000.00 (Ex. 4). Defendant himself valued the furniture and fixtures, car,
and amount owing on the mortgage (Ex. 3). Although ·
Exhibit 2 is shown as "Plaintiff's Exhibit" it was
furnished at time of trial by Defendant (Tr. 12, 13).
The Defendant's earnings statements showing some
1
$20,500.00 for the year 1969 and $17,423.00 for 1970 '
were prepared by and introduced by Defendant (Tr.
24).
Under our Rules (Rule 59-Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure), the only basis for bringing in new or ·
additional evidence is on grounds (3) accident or
surprise and ( 4) newly discovered evidence. With
respect to accident or surprise, our court has long
said that such is not a ground for a new trial if by
the exercise of ordinary diligence it could have
been avoided. Stewart Mining Co. v. Coulter, 3 Utah
174, 5 P. 557. To bring in newly discovered evidence
as a basis for a new trial it has long been held that
it must be shown that the moving party used due
diligence before the trial. Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 P. 50. The trial court
found that appellant had failed in both respects.
To succeed in obtaining a new trial, the defendant would have to come within either Rule 59(6), insufficiency of the evidence, or Rule 59(7), error in
6

law. While the trial judge did extend time for payment of the judgment from 18 to 54 months, he was
not otherwise impressed by defendant's contentions
and denied his motion (R. 56).
The matter of disposing of the property and providing for the support of divorced persons and their
minor children rests largely in the sound legal discretion of the trial courts, reversible only for abuse
of discretion. Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P.
292; Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612; 245 P. 329;
Tremayne v. Tremayne, 106 Utah 483, 211 P(2) 452
and Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah (2) 183, 429 P(2) 35.
In a divorce proceeding, the Supreme Court will not
substitute its judgment relative to alimony and division of propery for that of the trial court unless the
record clearly discloses that the trial court's decree
in such matter is plainly arbitrary. Allen v. Allen,
109 Utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872.
This case was tried by the court more than two
months after the close of the taxable year 1970
(Tr. 1). The evidence showing defendant's earnings
for 1970 and the value of his interest in the partnership was taken from an exhibit prepared by defendant's accountant as of November 30, 1970, and was
provided by and introduced by defendant (Ex. 2).
That exhibit shows that defendant's share of the
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partnership net earnings for that eleven month period was $17,423.39 of which he had then actually
withdrawn the sum of $16,139.89, leaving him an
equity in the business of $110,988.15 as of that time
(Ex. 2).
After the court had made its decision and had
entered the decree, defendant apparently deciderl
he should cut his income for 1970 and reduce the
amount of his equity in the business. He increased depreciation reserve from $69,018.29 as shown on the
November 30, 1970 statement (Ex. 2) to $80,462.82
on the December 31, 1970 statement attached to
defendant's motion ( R. 44), a difference of $11,444.52.
In addition, the current assets were reduced from
$270,199.15 to $238,770.87, a difference of $31,428.29.
The accounts receivable were decreased by sun2
$20,000.00 but accounts payable were only reduced
from $13j,615.41 on November 30 to $133,345.47 on
December 31, a difference of some $3,300.00. It is
n:.:teworthy that an operating statement was not
attached to the December 31 statement (TI. 44) as it
was to Ex. 2.
The amount withdrawn from the l1artnership
by the partners during the month is net shown. The
unexplained "Adjustments" resulted in a clrcrease of
partners equity from $222,308.82 on November 30, to

$178,598.54, a difference of $43, 710.28 on the December statement. (R. 44 and Ex. 2)
The November 30 statement (Ex. 2) does not give
a breakdown of the depreciable assets, but lumps all
equipment at a cost of $177,767.47 and buildings at
$17,703.07 with a total depreciation reserve for all
depreciable assets at $69,018.29. The December 31
statement, R. 44, shows the airplane at a cost of
$97,435.05 with a depreciation reserve of $40,500.00
thus leaving an unrecovered cost of slightly less
than $57,000.00. The very most difference the value
of the airplane could make if it is now worth $39,500
would be $17,500.00.
The partnership must have justified the purchase of the airplane by the needs of its business.
There appears to be no complaint as to the operation
or effectiveness of that machine nor in the fact that
it is used in the business. Since it is a business asset
apparently fully capable of performing the function
for which it was originally purchased, it seems to
Respondent that it could make little difference
whether its actual value is either more or less than
that upon which it was carried on the books of the
Company at the time of the trial.
The evidence before the court showed that there
was in the business current assets of more than
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$270,000 of which only $15,416.00 was represented by
inventory. The balance was divided about equally between cash and accounts receivable. Thus the bulk
of the business assets were not of the "quickly depreciating variety" as appellant claims in his brief.
In his Brief appellant argues that Respondent
was not only awarded one-third of the property but
also one-third of his income. Such is not the case.
Of the $650 per month presently required to be paid
by appellant, the sum of $400.00 was designated by
the decree as child support of $100.00 each for the
four minor children. The support of those minor
children is the responsibility of the appellant whether or not there was a divorce. Griffin v. Griffin 18
Ut 98, 55 P. 85. The $250.00 awarded to Respondent
for her support or alimony reduces to $150.00 as
quickly as appellant pays the money due as part of
the property settlement. By its decree the trial court
gave appellant 41/2 years to make that payment. Appellant can avoid the interest and save $1,200.00 per
year alimony by satisfying the judgment.
The evidence here shows that Respondent reasonably required $1,007.17 per month to make ends meet
for her and the four children (Ex. 1). She earns,
presently, $312.00 per month (Tr. 8). That leaves
$695.17 required for their bare necessities. Her debts
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1

and obligations including the dental bill, but excluding the house payment, total $2,622.74, requiring
monthly payments totaling $220.78 (Ex. 1). Appellant admits he draws $1,000.00 per month and claims
that his monthly needs total $440.00 per month including $390.00 for his own rent and food. (R. 20, 21)
That amounts to $5,220.00 annually. The further fact
is that during the first 11 months of 1970 the appellant had actually drawn a total of $16,139.89 from
the business (Ex. 2). In the calendar year 1969, he
earned $20,586.89 (Ex. 5). Taking his annual earnings at the $16,139.89 figure and reducing the same
by $7,800.00 per annum given to his wife and children
it still leaves appellant more than $3,100.00 per year
over and above his very huge estimated needs on a
yearly basis. By merely applying his excess to
payment of the judgment over a 41/2 year period he
could cut the judgment in half.
The court did not award Respondent any of the
partnership property. It merely awarded her a lien
on defendant's equity therein until the judgment ia
paid by the appellant. There is no judgment in favor
of respondent against the partnership as such, but
only against the appellant individually.
The evidence supports and justifies the decree of
the trial judge. This is not a situation where it could
be said that the evidence clearly preponderates
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against the trial court's findings. See Graziano v.
Graziano, 7 Utah (2) 187, 321 P (2) 931. There was
no plain abuse of discretion nor is there man ifest
injustice or inequity. See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah (2)
199, 321 p (2) 939.
The Respondent has been required to employ
counsel in connection with the appeal and she has
incurred expenses for printing brief and the like.
A reasonable fee for the use and benefit of Respondent's attorney and her other costs should be determined and allowed by the court.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and respondent should be awarded her attorney fee and necessary costs.
Respectfully submitted,
Clair M. Aldrich
of Aldrich, Bullock & Nelson
Attorney for Respondent
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah
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